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a b s t r a c t
This paper proposes a purpose-based access control model in distributed computing
environment for privacy preserving policies and mechanisms, and describes algorithms
for policy conﬂicting problems. The mechanism enforces access policy to data containing
personally identiﬁable information. The key component is purpose involved access control
models for expressing highly complex privacy-related policies with various features.
A policy refers to an access right that a subject can have on an object, based on attribute
predicates, obligation actions, and system conditions. Policy conﬂicting problems may arise
when new access policies are generated that are possible to be conﬂicted to existing
policies. As a result of the policy conﬂicts, private information cannot be well protected.
The structure of purpose involved access control policy is studied, and eﬃcient conﬂictchecking algorithms are developed and implemented. Finally a discussion of our work in
comparison with other related work such as EPAL is presented.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Privacy preserving is increasing in its importance since privacy becomes a major concern for both customers and enterprises in today’s corporate marketing strategies. This raises challenging questions and problems regarding the use and
protection of private messages, especially for context-aware web service [6]. One principle of protecting private information
is based on who is allowed to access private information and for what purpose [2]. For example, personal information provided by patients to hospitals may only be used with record purpose, not for advertising purpose. There must be purposes
for data collection and data access. The motivations for adopting purpose based approach are 1) the fundamental policies
for private information concern with which data object is used for what purposes [20] (for example, customers’ age and
email address are used for the purpose of marketing analysis), and 2) customers agreed data usage varies from individual to
individual. Information technology provides the capability to store various types of users’ information required during their
business activities. Indeed, Pitofsky [21] showed that 97 percent of web sites were collecting at least one type of identifying information such as name, home address, e-mail address, or postal address of consumers. The fact that the personal
information is collected and can be used without any consent or awareness violates privacy for many people. This paper
analyzes purpose based methods to secure private information.
Data privacy is deﬁned by policies describing to whom the data may be disclosed and what are the purposes of using
the data [1]. For example, a policy may specify that price of an air ticket from an agent may be disclosed, but only with
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“opted-in” customers, or that the price will be disclosed unless the agent has speciﬁcally “opted-out” of this default. While
there is recent work on deﬁning languages for specifying privacy policies [22,11], access control mechanisms for enforcing
such policies have not been investigated [16]. Ni et al. [19] analyzed a conditional privacy management with role based
access control, which supports expressive condition languages and ﬂexible relations among permission assignments for
complex privacy policies. But many interested problems remain, for example, developing a formal method to describe and
manage purposes and to automatically detect possible conﬂicts between access policies. As stated by Al-Harbi and Osborn [4]
and Adams and Sasse [3]: “Most invasions of privacy are not intentional but due to designers’ inability to anticipate how
this data could be used, by whom, and how this might affect users”?
Access control is signiﬁcant when disclosing private information in web service [14]. The importance of privacy has been
recognized for a long time, but the concept has not been supported in traditional access models, especially purpose based
access control systems. A security oﬃcer has to check privacy policies if an access is required. Furthermore, administrators
are prone to making mistakes when they generate new access policies to access sensitive data [7]. Such an approach signiﬁcantly increases the management efforts in distributed environments because of the various privacy requirements and
the continuous involvement from security oﬃcers. This paper bridges the gap between private information protecting technology and access control models. We start from building a purpose-based access framework and analyzing the conﬂicts
between purposes in access control policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the motivations behind our work in this paper.
Section 3 proposes a purpose based access framework which includes detailed information of purposes and access control
evaluation. Section 4 provides access control policy structure and authorization models as well as illustrates the impact of
generating a new access policy through examples. Section 5 describes conﬂict problems in access purposes and policies, and
develops algorithms for detecting conﬂicts between purposes. The implementation of the conﬂicting algorithms is described
in Section 6. Section 7 compares the work in this paper and related previous work, the comparisons demonstrate the
signiﬁcance of the work in this paper. Finally, the conclusion of the paper and further work are given in Section 8.
2. Motivations
The important techniques for private information occur in distributed systems speciﬁcally tailored to support privacy
policies, such as the well known P3P standard [27,11,13]. In particular, Agrawal et al. [2] introduced the concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating privacy protection in relational database systems. An important feature of their work is that
it uses some privacy metadata, consisting of privacy policies and privacy authorizations stored in privacy-policies tables and
privacy-authorizations tables respectively. However, they neither discussed the concepts of purpose with hierarchy structure,
nor the prohibition of purpose and association of purposes and data elements. LeFevre et al. [15] presented an approach to
enforce privacy policy in database systems. They introduced two models of cell level limited disclosure enforcement, namely
table semantics and query semantics, but did not consider access control management. Li et al. [16] devised generalization
boundary techniques to maximize data usability while, minimizing disclosure of privacy. Inspired by the fact that the permissible generalization level results in a much ﬁner level access control, the authors proposed a privacy-aware access control
model in web service environments and also analyzed an access process management through a trust-based decision and
ongoing access control policies. However, the concept of purpose was missed. Ni et al. [19] analyzed a role-based access
model for purpose-based privacy protection, but their work did not consider usage access management and the conﬂicts
between purposes in policies. The development of access technology entails addressing many challenging issues, ranging
from modeling to architectures, and may lead to the next-generation of access management. This paper develops purpose
based access technology for privacy violation challenges including complex policy structured models with access control.
Privacy violations may happen when data are released to third parties [2]. Data once released are not any longer under
the control of the organizations owning them, and the data owners are not able to control the way data are used. The
most common approach to address the privacy of released data is to modify the data by removing all information that
can directly link data items with individuals [24]. It is important to note that simply removing identity information, like
names or social-security numbers, from the released data may not be enough to anonymize the data. Many examples show
that even when such information is removed from the released data, the remaining data combined with other information
sources may still link the information to the individuals it refers to [23]. Sweeney [25] proposed approaches based on the
notion of k-anonymity as solutions of the problem. Another secure private information techniques such as density-based
clustering algorithms happens in the context of data mining [18].
Data mining techniques are today very effective. Thus even though a database is sanitized by removing private information, the use of data mining techniques may allow one to recover the removed information. These techniques are based
on modifying or perturbing the data in some way; for example, techniques specialized for privacy preserving mining of
association rules modify the data so to reduce the conﬁdence of sensitive association rules [12]. A problem common to
those techniques is represented by the quality of the resulting data; if data undergo too many modiﬁcations, they may not
be useful any longer [10].
Secure private information cannot be easily achieved by traditional access management systems because traditional access management systems focus on which user is performing what action on which data object [28], and privacy policies are
concerned with which data object is used for what purpose(s). For example, a common privacy agreement between a data
collector and customers is “we use customer information for marketing purposes and to enable help us to resolve problems
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Fig. 1. Example of purpose structure.

with services” that does not specify who can access the customer information, but only states that the information can be
accessed for the purposes of marketing and customer service. Another challenge in access control policies is the conﬂict
problem when generating new policies. For example, assume three access control policies and no conﬂicts between two
access control policies; however it may lead to conﬂicts when three access policies are executed.
This paper focuses exclusively on how to specify and enforce policies for authorizing purpose-based access management
using a rule-based language. We propose a comprehensive framework for purpose and data management where purposes
are organized in a hierarchy. In our approach each data element is associated with a set of purposes, as opposed to a
single security level in traditional secure applications. Also, the purposes form a hierarchy and can vary dynamically. These
requirements are more complex than those concerning traditional secure applications [17]. To provide suﬃcient functions
with the framework, this paper analyzes the explicit prohibition of purpose and the association of a set of purposes with
access control policies. Furthermore, we discuss the conﬂict problems with multiple access control policies and develop
algorithms for detecting and resolving conﬂicts. This kind of analysis for purpose-based usage control for privacy preserving
has not been studied.
3. Purpose involved access control framework
This section develops a purpose based access control framework called PACF. PACF includes extended access control
models and supports purpose hierarchy by introducing the intended and access purposes, and purpose associated data
models. It is supposed authorization approaches in access control models to be applied for access purpose determination in
database systems.
Purpose A purpose describes the reason(s) for data collection and data access [19]. A set of purposes P , is organized in
a tree structure, referred to as a Purpose Tree PT, where each node represents a purpose in P and each edge represents
a hierarchical relation (i.e., specialization and generalization) between two purposes. Fig. 1 gives an example of a purpose
tree.
Let P i and P j be two purposes in a purpose tree. P i is senior to P j (or P j is junior to P i ) if there exists a downward
path from P i to P j in the tree. Based on the tree structure of purposes, the partial relationships between purposes are
existed. Suppose PT is a purpose tree and P is a set of purposes in PT. Pu ∈ P is a purpose, the senior purposes of Pu,
denoted by Senior(Pu), is the set of all nodes that are senior to Pu. For example, Senior(Record) = {Admin, General Purpose}
in Fig. 1. The junior purposes of Pu, denoted by Junior(Pu), is the set of all nodes that are junior to Pu. For instance,
Junior(Admin) = {Advertise, Record}.
We design an access control model by adding purposes and policy language, and discuss the details of the access purpose authorization and veriﬁcation based on the model. Intuitively, an access to a speciﬁc data element should be allowed
if the allowed purposes for the data, stated by the privacy policies, include or imply the purpose of the data access. Access
purpose authorizations are granted to users based on the access purpose on the data, obligations and conditions. Authorizations approaches in access control such as pre-Authorizations model and ongoing-Authorizations model have already been
introduced [26], and access purpose authorizations in access control policies are analyzed in this paper.
4. Access control policies
We introduce the structure of access control policy after introducing the basic concepts of purposes [8]. Policies are
deﬁned to apply to this system. Let us assume a generic computer system that possesses data or resources that need to be
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protected from unauthorized accesses. Privacy preserving is achieved by through authorization models and policy operations
in the designed access control policies.
Deﬁnition 4.1. An access control policy (rule) is a tuple of the form
(Subjects, Action, Resources, Purpose, Condition, Obligation)
The subjects terms identiﬁes a user or a group who requests an action onto the resources. The action is any operation
(e.g. deleting a ﬁle) to a resource in the access application. The resources term identiﬁes a subset of objects which are
normally private information that access to the objects is restricted. The purpose is selected pre-deﬁned set of purposes that
is reasons subjects intend to execute an action. The condition is a Boolean expression (i.e. a predicate) and “Obligations” are
requirements that have to be followed by the subject for having access to resources. For instance, users are asked to accept
the agreement of privacy policy when installing Skype software; otherwise, the software cannot be used. We do not discuss
conditions in this paper due to limited space available in this paper.
Subjects, action, and resources are the same concepts in traditional access control policies that specify who can access
what with action. Purposes are applied to achieve ﬁne-grained polices. The purpose checks for properties of the context with
no intended side effects. If a side effect exists we need to consider other arguments like obligations and conditions in authorization process. We brieﬂy discuss obligations in this paper but the detailed analysis for obligations is omitted. As we mentioned in the ﬁrst section, the purpose is the reason to collect the resources and is indispensable to private access policies.
The following two examples are positive and negative authorizations, respectively. The security policy example includes
two rules.
Example 1: “Hua can access purchase information for marketing purpose during working hours”;
Example 2: “Christine cannot update phone numbers for record purpose anytime”.
In the ﬁrst rule S = Hua, A = read, R = purchase information, P = marketing, C = 8:00am–6:00pm. There is no obligations
in the examples. The second example with negative authorization, S = Christine, A = update, R = phone number, P = record,
C = anytime.
4.1. Authorization models
Deﬁnition 4.2. The PAC model is composed of the following components:
1) A set S of Subjects, a set D of Data, a set Pu = AIP , PIP of purposes (detailed AIP and PIP are in [9]), a set A of actions,
a set of O for obligations and a set of C for conditions.
2) A set of data access right DA = {(d, a) | a ∈ A , d ∈ D },
3) A set of private data access right PDR = {(da, a, pu, c , o) | da ∈ DA, pu ∈ Pu, c ∈ C , o ∈ O , a ∈ A },
4) Private data subject assignment PDS ⊆ S × PDR is a many-to-many relation that decides what subjects with which access
purposes can access the private information based on authorizations.
In what follows we provide additional details on the purpose involved language of PAC model and elaborate on conﬂicts
among purposes and obligations. To simplify the purpose involved authorization models, we assume that PIP = φ , and then
Pu = AIP.
We illustrate through an example a privacy preserving expressed with PAC model. Suppose that Food and Drug Administration (http://www.fda.gov/) is a web site aiming at audience that deploys its privacy policies with the purpose tree in
Fig. 1:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Subjects = {Hua, Tony, Christine, Den},
Action = {Read, Update, Delete},
Data = {OrderInfo, HomePhone, PostAdd, EmailAdd},
Purpose = {Order, Complaint, Billing, Shipping, ProblemSolving, Others}.
The following privacy policies:

1.
2.
3.
4.

“Hua can read customers’ PostAddress for shipping purpose”.
“Tony can only read customers’ Email address for purchase purpose if they allow to do so”.
“Christine may read customers’ order information for Billing purpose; and customers will be informed by Email”.
“Den can read customers’ Home Phone for Problem solving if it is approved by Hua”.
These policies are expressed as follows in PAC model:

P1: (Hua, (PostAdd, Read), Shipping, N/A, φ )
P2: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Purchase, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ )
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P3: (Christine, (OrderInfor, Read), Billing, N/A, Notify(ByEmail))
P4: (Den, (HomePhone, Read), Problemsolving, ‘Approved by Hua’, N/A)
4.2. Policy operations
This section analyzes the impact of generating new policies to an existing PAC model. It may have unforeseen problems
while a new policy for privacy protection is raised. For example, when Tony moves to the complaint department, a new
policy is deﬁned:
5. “Tony can only read Email address of customers, for complaint purpose if they allow to do so”
The corresponding expression in PAC is:
P5: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ ).
Comparing to P2, these are two policies for Tony to access Email address for different purposes. What is the results of
these two policies if combine them together? Normally, we should apply P2 for Tony to access email address for Purchase
purpose and, apply P5 to access email address for Complaint purpose.
The differences in these two policies are the purposes where one is Purchase purpose while the other one is Complaint
purpose. How the system will verify? Should the system verify Complaint for the access to email addresses with consent
conditions? PAC achieves that by considering different access policies as linked by a conjunction.
That is, if a user U wants to access right a on data d for purpose Pu, all access polices of U related to ((d, a), Pu) must
be checked. U can read the d if there exists at least one policy and U can satisfy all purposes in all policies. If a new access
policy is related to the same user, same data, same right and same conditions of some existed private policies, it is not used
to relax the access situations but to make the access stricter. If privacy oﬃcers want to relax the access environments, they
can do so by revising the existed access policies instead of creating a new one.
Suppose two private access policies in PAC: (u 1 , (d1 , r1 ), pu1 , c 1 , φ) and (u 1 , (d1 , r1 ), pu2 , c 1 , φ), can we simply replace
them with a new one as (u 1 , (r1 , d1 ), pu1 ∧ pu2 , c 1 , φ)? Consider P2 and P5, we have the following policy:
P6: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint ∧ Purchase, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ ).
From the purpose hierarchy structure in Fig. 1, Complaint ∧ P urchase = Complaint since Complaint is junior to purpose
Purchase. Translating P6 into plain English, we obtain “Tony can read customers’ Email address for Complaint purpose if the
customers agree to do so”. The translating is not correct since something is lost. Tony cannot access email addresses, for
purposes of Problem solving and Other purchase purposes which are not included. The reason for this is the context variable
purchase purpose in P5. The variable purchase purpose separates the values of order into three disjoint sets: Complaint,
Problem solving and Others not included in the ﬁrst two purposes. P2 thus applies to all three kinds of customers, while
P5 only applies to email addresses for Complaint purpose. Simply combining purposes in P2 with purposes in P5 actually
removes all purposes except Complaint purpose for access email addresses.
The notion of splitting context variables is required to analyze this problem [19].
Deﬁnition 4.3. A splitting context variable (SCV) is a context variable that satisﬁes the following conditions.
1. An SCV is related to purpose information.
2. The values of an SCV partition purposes into disjoint sets.
3. An SCV is not used to represent information about consent.
Based on the SCV deﬁnition, Order is SCV, whereas Admin and Direct-Use are not since the joint sets of Advertising and
Record, D-Address and D-Phone are not empty. The notion of SCV is important and is used in the analysis of the paper. We
are now able to give an answer to the aforementioned question: only if both pu1 and pu2 do not involve SCV, or the SCV
that they involve have the same values, they could be safely rewritten into pu1 ∧ pu2 .
Consider the following two access policies:
P7: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ )
P8: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), N/A, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ ).
P7 and P8 can be revised as:
P9: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ ).
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Similarly, the following two access policies:
P10: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Shipping, OwnerAge ≤ 13, φ )
P11: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Record, OwnerAge ≤ 13 φ )
P12: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Shipping ∧ Record, OwnerAge ≤ 13, φ )
P12 is equivalent to P10 and P11. We now rewrite P2 and P5 as following policies:
P13: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Shipping ∪ Billing ∪ Problemsolving ∪ Promotion, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ )
P14: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, φ )
It is easy to understand P13 and P14 rather than P2 and P5. ∪ means “or” in the example. We do not have obligations
in the discussion above. What may happen if there are obligations? Consider the following example:
P15: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, NotifybyPhone)
P16: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Purchase, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, NotifybyEmail)
Intuitively, P15 is ﬁne for Tony reading customers’ email address for Complaint purpose. This means that the phone
activity should be invoked for Complaint purpose when accessing customers’ data for Purchase purpose by notiﬁed by
Email. Therefore, their equivalent forms are:
P17: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, NotifybyPhone and NotifybyEmail)
P18: (Tony, (EmailAdd, Read), Shipping ∪ Billing ∪ Problemsolving ∪ Promotion, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’, NotifybyEmail)
In summary, a private data access request related to user u, data d, access right a, purpose Pu is authorized only if all
access policies related to (u , (r , d), Pu) are satisﬁed. If so, obligations in all applicable policies are invoked after the access
request.
5. Conﬂicting algorithms
In the section, we discuss the various cases of conﬂicting policies in PAC model. It is not easy to comply with complex security and privacy policies, especially in large enterprises. The more complex a security policy is, the larger is the
probability that such policy contains inconsistent and conﬂicting parts.
Consider the following policies:
P19: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), Shipping, Time = 5PM–11PM, φ )
P20: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), Problem solving, Time = 5PM–11PM, φ )
These two policies do not conﬂict with each other because P19 and P20 actually work on different purposes. The SCV
Order used in these two policies as purposes with different values. It is called incomparable policies because they have
incomparable purposes, that is, an SCV exists which has two disjoint value sets in the two purposes.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let pui and pu j be two purposes in two access control policies. We say that pui and pu j are incomparable
purposes if there exists a common SCV that has disjoint value sets in purposes pui and pui . Otherwise, we say that pui and
pu j are comparable purposes, written as pui ≈ pu j .
Consider the following two permission assignments which include comparable purposes:
P21: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), Purchase, Time = 9AM–5PM, φ )
P22: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), Billing, Time = 9AM–5PM, φ )
Because P21 allows data access during 9AM–5PM with Purchase purpose and P22 allows data access during in the same
time with Billing purpose, a data request occurs during 9AM–5PM with Billing purpose could be authorized. These two
policies are compatible because they have compatible purposes: the intersection of value sets of context variable Order in
different access policies is not empty.
Besides compatible purposes, we may have conﬂicting purposes.
P23: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), purchase, Time = 5PM–11PM, φ )
P24: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), audit, Time = 5PM–11PM, φ ).
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P23 speciﬁes that Christine is authorized to access order information for Purchase during 5PM–11PM, whereas P24
allows partners’ access with Audit during 5PM–11PM. Hence, when data access request is issued, the access purpose could
not be both purchase and audit. Therefore, any data request will be denied according to these two access policies. These
two permission assignments conﬂict with each other because they have conﬂicting purposes, that is, no value of the context
variable Order could satisfy both purposes.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let pui and pu j be two comparable purposes in two access policies. We say that pui and pu j are conﬂicting purposes if there exists at least one common context variable in pui and pu j that has disjoint value sets, written as
pui pu j . Otherwise, we say that pui and pu j are compatible purposes.
Consider the following access policies which include conﬂicting obligations:
P25: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), purchase, N/A, Notify())
P26: (Christine, (Read, OrderInfor), purchase, N/A, Notify(Opt-out))
Once a data request is authorized, the system does not know which obligation should be executed (either Notify or
Notify with Opt-out); therefore P25 conﬂicts with P26.
We denote the fact that two obligations o i and o j conﬂict as o i o j .
Based on aforementioned deﬁnitions and examples, we give the deﬁnition of conﬂicting access policies.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Let Pi = (ui , (ri , di ), pui , ci , oi ) and Pj = (u j , (r j , dj ), pu j , c j , oj ) be two privacy-sensitive data access policies.
We say that Pi and Pj are conﬂicting if one of the following two conditions holds:

(ui = u j ) ∧ (ri = r j ) ∧ (di = dj ) ∧ (ci = c j ) ∧ (pui pu j )
(ui = u j ) ∧ (ri = r j ) ∧ (di = dj ) ∧ (ci = c j ) ∧ (pui ≈ pu j ) ∧ (oi

oj )

In PAC, conﬂicting access policies should be detected and one of them should be removed to prevent ambiguities when
enforcing access policies.
Detecting algorithms
Conﬂicting policies detection is important in order to guarantee the consistency of access control policy. In this section,
we present algorithms to detect conﬂicts between purposes and to check conﬂicts in access control policies. The key point
of the algorithm is that we ﬁrst sort context variables used in conditions according to their name, then make a disjoint test
for the value sets for a variable in the various conditions.
Algorithm 1. Purpose-Conﬂict(pu1, pu2)
Require: pu1 and pu2 are two purposes applied in two access control policies
Outcomes: True //Purposes have conﬂicts
False //Otherwise
1: pul1 : Sort context variables used in pu1 according to their name
2: pul2 : Sort context variables used in pu2 according to their name
3: for(integer i = 1 to |pul1 |)
4: { for(integer j = 1 to |pul2 |)
5:
{ if pul1 [i ].name = pul2 [ j ].name //Common context variable
6:
then
7:
{ if pul1 [i ].SCV = True //pul1 [i ] is an SCV
8:
{if disjointTest(pul1 [i ].value, pul2 [ j ].value) = ‘False’ pul1 [i ].value and pul2 [ j ].value have joint value sets,
no conﬂicts between pul1 [i ] and pul2 [ j ]
9:
then j++ //check the next purpose in pu2
10:
else
11:
Return True //Conﬂict purposes }
12:
else j++ //check the next purpose in pu2 }
13: else j++ }
14: i++ //check the next purpose in pu1
15: Return result
Based on the Purpose-Conﬂict algorithm, the access control policy detection algorithm is given below. The idea of the
algorithm is to test the purpose conﬂicts ﬁrst, if so the policies are conﬂict. Otherwise, check the obligations to determine
if or not the policies are conﬂict.
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Algorithm 2. Policy-Conﬂict(po1, po2)
Require: po1 and po2 are two access control policies
Outcomes: True //Policies have conﬂicts
False //Otherwise
1: if po1 .s = po2 .s or po1 .d = po2 .d or po1 .r = po2 .r or po1 .c = po2 .c, then
2: return False
3: end if
4:
{ if Purpose-Conﬂict(po1 .pu, po2 .pu) = True
5:
//Checking conﬂicts between two purposes in two policies
6:
return True //purposes conﬂict
7:
//policies conﬂict
8:
else //po1 .pu ≈ po2 .pu
9:
{if {(po1 .o ∩ po2 .o) = φ //obligations are comparable
10:
then
11:
{if Obligation-Conﬂict(po1 .o, po2 .o) = True
12:
return True //Obligations conﬂicts
13:
else return False //no conﬂicts in policies }
14:
else //SCV-Disjoint(po1 .o, po2 .o) = False, Obligation incomparable
15:
return False //No conﬂicts in policies}
16: }
Based on Algorithms 1, 2 and the structure of access purpose and policy, we can further develop algorithms with SQL to
support the purpose and policy management approach presented in this paper. The detailed methods with SQL are omitted.
6. Experimental results
This section presents the implementation of the access control policy algorithms with Microsoft Visual Studio technology.
The reason of using Microsoft Visual Studio technology is that we do not need to worry about the data structure including
attributes in each access control policy. It is easy to add attributes to the existing policy table when another access policy
is required to join or create in future. This is a web-based project implemented in XAMPP (http://www.apachefriends.org/
en/xampp.html) environment in windows platform using MySql database and Apache web server. Due to the open source
MySQL database with high performance, high reliability and ease of use, it is used to store the information of subjects,
actions, resources, purposes and obligations in policy in the implementation. We store the structure of policy, purpose
hierarchy, resources and so on. Apache was the ﬁrst viable alternative to the Netscape Communications Corporation web
server, and since has evolved to dominate other web servers in terms of functionality and performance, making applications
easily portable to all of the operating systems on which Google Chrome runs. With Microsoft Visual Studio, it is able to go
to the next level with html5.
The implementation of the access control policy algorithms includes many components, for example:
1) The structure of database including access control policy, resource and purpose
2) Conﬂicts of purposes, obligations and policies
3) Conditions and obligations in policies.
Clients are requiring using a modern web browser such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firebox, Internet Explorer 6 or over
and enable cookies. The computer must have an Internet connection in order to be able to access the system.
Database Design
The database to implement the PAC model consists of many tables such as Policy, Resource and Purpose. For example,
the policy table named policy.mdf is deﬁned in the PAC model which is a tuple of form (Subject, Action, Resources, Purpose,
Condition, Obligation). Fig. 2 below shows the deﬁnition of the Policy Table.
User Interface
In order to make the implementation more convenient we developed a graphical user interface which interacts with
the procedures of creating and removing policies. The graphical user interface is illustrated in Fig. 3. This interface was
developed using Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 Ultimate and MySql database is used to initiate the generating access control
policy instead of typing the above procedure call. This implementation is convenient for administrators since they only need
to deﬁne the purpose hierarchy and obligation structure.
Fig. 3 shows the page of all policies deﬁned in database in a data grid. They can be modiﬁed by edit and delete. To access
the resource we have to enter policy Id in the text box given upper side of data grid and click on Submit button. To add
new policy we need to click on Add Policy button as below.
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Fig. 2. Policy structure.

Fig. 3. Creating policy.

Fig. 4. Comparable policy.

Comparable policy
If a new policy is created which consists of the data given below, the new policy is comparable to the existing policy 16
which has same Subject, Action, Resource and Obligation except purpose with Purchase and here purpose is Billing in Fig. 4.
Due to the comparable property it will show a message of comparable policy and add the new policy to the database.
Conﬂict of purposes
When a new policy is planed to add which has data like given below, the new policy is now compared to the policy 16
which has same Subject, Action, Resource and Obligation and purpose is Purchase and here purpose is Audit, due to they are
incompatible it will give us message of conﬂict of purpose and the new policy is not able to add to the database as shown
in Fig. 5.
Conﬂict of obligations
It is quite similar to the conﬂict of purposes when the implementation deals with the obligation conﬂicts. When a new
policy which has data given below, it is compared to the existing policy 16 which has same Subject, Action, Resource and
Purpose but Obligation is NA and here Obligation is NAT. Due to they are conﬂicted it will give us message of conﬂict of
obligation and it is not able to add to the database as shown in Fig. 6.
The advantages of the implementation are 1) providing a user interface for administrators to manage access control
policies with various purposes and obligations since users can create and delete policy from the database without technical
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Fig. 5. conﬂict of purposes.

Fig. 6. Creating policy with conﬂicting obligation.

support which is eﬃcient for system organizers; 2) The system provides a solution for conﬂicting policy problem, it supports
not only the conﬂicts of purpose, but also the conﬂicts of obligations. 3) Implementation with Microsoft Visual Studio
technology which is easy to manage life targeting an increasing number of platforms and technologies in future. However,
we do not analyze generalized temporal constraints and the workﬂow of the policy creating processes, we suppose to
complete them in our future work.
7. Comparisons
We present a brief comparison of the purpose involved access model PAC against other related work. The closely related
works to this paper are privacy-aware role-based access control [19], the enterprise privacy authorization language (EPAL)
[22] and a conditional role-involved purpose-based access control model [14].
Ni et al. [19] introduced a family of models that extend the well known RBAC model in order to provide full support for
expressing highly complex privacy-related policies, taking into account features like purposes and obligations. The models
include the Core P-RBAC model, Hierarchical P-RBAC model, Conditional P-RBAC and Universal P-RBAC. Their work is different
from ours in three aspects. First, their paper is focused on the conditions and their relationships in role-based access
control. By contrast, our work has analyzed the purpose hierarchy structure in access control policies in usage access control
model. Second, the conﬂicts between two P-RBAC permission assignments discussed in their paper are based on conditions.
They neither analyze the access purpose structure nor the impact of adding a new access policy with different purposes.
By contrast, our work has analyzed purpose hierarchical structure and the impact of adding new access control policies,
specially the conﬂicting problem between three purposes.
EPAL [22] is a formal language for writing enterprise privacy policies to govern data handling practices in IT systems
according to ﬁne-grained positive and negative authorization rights. It concentrates on the core privacy authorization while
abstracting data models and user-authentication from all deployment details such as data model or user-authentication.
An EPAL policy deﬁnes lists of hierarchies of data-categories, user-categories, and purposes, and sets of (privacy) actions,
obligations, and conditions. Purposes model the intended service for which data is used (e.g., processing a travel expense
reimbursement or auditing purposes). Compared to EPAL, PAC has the following major differences. First, one of the important
design criteria of PAC is to unify privacy policy enforcement and access control policy enforcement into one access control
model. By contrast, EPAL is designed independently from any access control model. Second, the conﬂicting policies problem
was not introduced and analyzed in EPAL; hence shortcoming exists during answering data access request [5], but PAC
supports conﬂict detection to guarantee that no conﬂicts arise in the procedures of generating new policies, thus preventing
the disclosure of private information. Third, the basic ideas of purpose in PAC are borrowed from EPAL, the purposes in EPAL
represent reasons of data collection without further discussion such as conﬂicts from a privacy perspective; by contrast
purposes in PAC have rich analysis and conﬂict algorithms.
The paper [14] proposed a privacy preserving access control which is based on variety of purposes. Conditional purpose is
applied along with allowed purpose and prohibited purpose in the model. The structure of conditional purpose-based access
control model is deﬁned and investigated through dynamic roles. An algorithm is developed to achieve the compliance
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computation between access purposes and intended purposes and is illustrated with Role-based access control (RBAC) in a
dynamic manner to support conditional purpose-based access control. However, the paper did not analyze the structure of
access control policy, nor the associated access control models, access purposes, obligations and conﬂicts between access
purposes and between access control policies, but instead discussed how to extend traditional access control models to a
further coverage of privacy preserving in data mining atmosphere.
8. Conclusions and future work
This paper has discussed purpose-based access control policies with conditions and obligations in distributed computing
environments. We have studied the access control framework but also the structure of access policies including subjects,
access actions, resources, purposes and obligations. We have also analyzed the impact of adding new policies and the
conﬂicts that they can lead to. Algorithms have been developed and to help a system to detect and solve the problems.
Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate the practicality and performance of the algorithms. The work in this
paper has extended previous work signiﬁcantly in several aspects, for example, purpose involved access control, access
control policies and generating a new access policy without conﬂicts.
The research for purpose involved access control policies is still in its infancy and much further work remains to be done.
There could exist redundant access policies in PAC. For instance, P7 is redundant with respect to P8. Formal deﬁnitions of
the redundancy need to be developed and solutions for addressing them are possible avenues for our future work.
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